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THE VALIDITY OF EXTRATERRITORIAL MUNICIPAL ZONING
OTIS J. BOUWSMA*
INTRODUCTION
Advances in the fields of transportation and communication have
made necessary a vast amount of law which was foreign to the statute
books of a century ago. So, also, in the field of local government,
changes in conditions have required alterations in, and additions to, the
old law of municipal corporations. Comprehensive municipal zoning,
as it exists today, is such an addition to our laws. The subject of
zoning is not new, but it was not until 1926 that it became a fixed and
important part of our laws. In that year the United States Supreme
Court, in the leading case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Company' upheld the validity of comprehensive municipal zoning.
In the Village of Euclid case the Realty Company brought suit in,
the federal district court to enjoin the enforcement of a zoning
ordinance, on the grounds that the ordinance and its application
violated both the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution. The suit did not allege a denial of a specific right or
a particular injury, but attacked the law generally. The Court held
that in its general scope and dominant features the ordinance was
a valid exercise of authority, and that a comprehensive zoning ordi-
nance does not per se violate the Constitution.
A body of law does not suddenly spring up. A period of development
is required during which there is a gradual evolution of a compre-
hensive and coherent body of law. So, the law of zoning did not go
immediately from the one extreme of completely unregulated city
development to the other extreme of closely restricted city planning
and zoning. Throughout the years tremendous changes in living con-
ditions were taking place; sign board regulation was developing;2
and cities were prohibiting noxious uses of property for the benefit
of the whole community.3 These things paved the way for the holding
in Village of Euclid v. Ambler. That decision did not, of course,
provide a full-grown body of law. Our law of zoning has taken a
number of years to develop, and is still being developed by the
flow of judicial decisions.
That development has now occurred to the point where it seems
worthwhile to examine some of its phases. This paper will treat
only one phase of the topic-the extraterritorial exercise of the
* Formerly Professor of Law, Cumberland University.
1. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
2. SmITH, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ZONING 14 (1937).
3. See, e.g., Green v. Mayor of Savannah, 6 Ga. 1 (1849); Harrison v. Mayor
of Baltimore, 1 Gill 264 (Md. 1843).
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zoning power; that is, the exercise of the zoning power of a munici-
pality outside the corporate boundaries. Since this area has not
been widely explored by the courts, a portion of the argument is
necessarily presented by way of analogy.
NEED FOR EXTRATERRITORIAL ZONING
The shift of population from the rural areas to urban centers has
been characteristic in recent years. Practically all cities have been
growing in area and population. That municipal growth is seldom
orderly, however, and does not always go in the direction predicted.
"The city grows like a forest, not like the rings of a tree."
'4
A distinction must be made between the city and the metropolitan
area. The city is usually the center of the metropolitan area which,
as a whole, constitutes an economic unity. A large segment of the
population, working and trading within the city, may live in the
area beyond the corporate limits. Industries which are vital to the
welfare of the community may be located outside the city. Thus
the city and the metropolitan area surrounding it are mutually
interdependent.
Logic would seem to suggest that a single economic unit such as
the city and its surrounding metropolitan area should be a single
political unit; extension of the city boundaries to include the area
would be an effective means of achieving this end. But the solution
is easier to state than to accomplish. Although the area may constitute
a physical and economic unit, it may not be a social unit.5 For reasons
which may be historical, financial, political, or otherwise, the residents
in that area adjacent to the corporate boundaries may vigorously op-
pose any move to place them within the municipality. Then, too,
municipal boundaries and the annexation of territory adjacent to
cities are subjects over which the state has plenary power, and there
is no constitutional requirement that the legislature enact what
seems logical.
In the suburban-area there may be present buildings and property
uses which are not conducive to the health, safety and general wel-
fare of the community as a whole. Fire hazards may exist; certain
types of enterprises may be there' conducted which are obnoxious
and, as generally recognized, should not be present in. the immediate
vicinity of a concentration of population; and the suburban area may
constitute a wholly non-aesthetic pattern. Under such conditions it
would seem quite obvious that proper regulations and controls over
buildings and property uses would be for the good of the community.
A proper zoning law would provide such regulations and controls.
4. From a speech by Thomas Reed before the National Municipal League. St.
Louis, Mo., Nov. 9, 1926.
5. BAKER, THE LEGAL ASPECTS or ZONING 164 (1927).
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The term "zoning" is frequently confused with "planning." They
are not synonymous; there is a distinction and it should be observed,
even though the two are related and do overlap. Perhaps the best
definition of those terms and, at the same time, the best differentiation,
has been made by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky when it said:
"Broadly speaking, 'planning' connotes systematic development of an
area with particular reference to location, character, and extent of
streets, squares, and parks and to kindred mapping and charting,
and 'zoning' relates to regulation of use of property, to structural and
architectural designs of buildings, and, the character of uses to which
the property or the buildings within classified or designed districts
may be put."6
It may be suggested that such a stringent law as zoning is unneces-
sary because the property owners already have a solution available
in the form of deed or contract restriction upon building and the
use of property. The results of private restriction, imposed by deed
or agreement, and zoning ordinances are similar. However, zoning
has certain advantages over private restrictions. A zoning law sets up
requirements which are uniform and will protect each property owner
from his neighbor, providing for their mutual benefit. A zoning
ordinance is enforceable by the municipal authorities and it is also
enforceable by the individual property owner who may bring suit
for an injunction restraining a violation of the ordinance.7 That system
of enforcement is far superior to enforcement of private restrictions.
With the passage of time and changing conditions, private restrictions
may cease to be a benefit and become a burden. It would be most
difficult to establish changed circumstances as an excuse for failing
to comply with a private restriction. The zoning ordinance depends
upon the surrounding circumstances as the basis for its reasonableness
and validity.8
Another possible alternative to extraterritorial zoning by the munici-
pal authorities would be to establish a district or an authority for
the purpose of performing two services-planning and zoning of
the metropolitan area. Such a district would resemble the sanitary
district, park district, or school district which is common throughout
the United States. An example is the Division of Metropolitan Plan-
ning, a subdivision of the Metropolitan District Commission which
operates in the Boston area. That unit deals with planning, but not
with zoning, of the area. Such a district, with authority both to plan
and to zone, would solve the problem of zoning the area just beyond
the corporate boundaries and would eliminate one argument against
6. Seligman v. Belknap, 288 Ky. 133, 155 S.W.2d 735 (1941).
7. Snow v. Johnston, 197 Ga. 146, 28 S.E.2d 270 (1943).
8. Wulfson v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 150 N.E. 120 (1925).
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extraterritorial municipal zoning-namely, it is usually unjust ,and
unsuccessful to give one governmental unit control-over the territory
and people of another, and it confuses both units.9 However, even
such a district or "authority" would cause some confusion because
of overlapping political boundaries.
Still another solution to the general problem is to have the county
zone the area beyond the city limits. This is of course a perfectly
valid and proper remedy. Its effectiveness may be open to question.
A mutual recognition of the common problem, and a willingness to
cooperate is necessary between the county and city governments. Too,
counties vary considerably, and in many cases the county government
organization is inadequate to administer a zoning law properly.. The
municipal corporation is much more likely to have the organization
necessary to write and effectively administer a zoning ordinance.
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF MUNICIPAL ZONING ORDINANCES
Each of the solutions previously suggested hereinabove has been
subject to significant objections. We will now consider the validity of
an ordinance passed by the municipal government and designed to
apply to the metropolitan area outside the city limits, as well as to the
city itself. Though at first blush such a solution seems far-fetched,
it appears more logical when one considers that the city may be the
only government properly equipped to administer a zoning law. The
legality of such a solution-the application of a city's comprehensive
zoning ordinance beyond its corporate limits-has not been passed
upon by the courts.
Municipalities are not vested with inherent powers; a city govern-
ment exercises various types of powers because it has been authorized
to do so by the state. A municipality may possess and exercise 'first,
all powers granted in express terms consistent with the United States
Constitution, treaties and laws, and the state constitution and general
laws of the state, second, certain implied or incidental powers,. in
like manner consistent (1) necessarily arising from those expressly
granted or (2) those essential to give effect to powers expressly
granted, or (3) those recognized as pertaining or indispensible to
local civil government, to enable it to fulfill the objects and purposes
for which it was organized and brought into existence." 10
Thus, municipal laws or ordinances are subordinate to all laws
of the state and Federal Government. In considering the relationship
between the city and the state, the state has properly been termed
"the parent sovereign."" If all laws are placed in an "hierarch of
9. BAKER, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF ZONING 124 (1927).
10. McQuILIaN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 367 (2d ed. 1940).




laws," thle municipal ordinances appear at the bottom and are subject
to all of the superior types of laws.
12
The legal basis for a municipal zoning ordinance is, then, a con-
stitutional authorization or-far more commonly-an enabling statute.
The enabling statute may be either a general or a special law of the
state legislature, in either case granting to the city the authority to
zone. A comprehensive zoning ordinance must then be passed pur-
suant to the enabling statute. When the authority for a zoning ordi-
nance is found in an enabling statute; the ordinance must follow the
statute, for there is no other justification for the existence of the
municipal power. The ordinance must not be more inclusive nor
more restrictive than the legislative authorization. But a zoning
ordinance, properly passed pursuant to an enabling act, is safe from
successful attack. The ordinance may be declared invalid in some
respect because of its applicability to a particular use or location, but
the right of the city to pass a comprehensive zoning law will be upheld
by- the courts.' 3 A valid zoningordinance has the "force of a statute;"
it is as though the law were passed by the legislature itself.
14
The power to zone is a part of the police power which is inherent
in-the state, and it can be exercised by a municipality to the extent
that it has been delegated by the state to the city. If the grant has
been a broad one, then the municipality may exercise the power
broadly.
The term "police power" can be described by general words but
cannot be definitely and exactly defined.15 It includes regulations for
the promotion of the public convenience or the general prosperity.
The-word "comfort" has also been used to describe the regulations
which can be adopted under the police power.16 The police power
is not static, but is flexible and adaptive. It is elastic to meet changing
and shifting conditions. It must be adaptive to provide proper regu-
lations'required by a changing world; 7 to meet the problems arising
from the increased population, the increased interdependence of
people, and the complex commercial and social relations of the citizens.
"It:is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of
this poWer than to mark its boundaries or prescribe limits to its
exercise."18 Mr. Justice Holmes pointed out that the "police power
extends to all great public needs" and it is indefinite so that its lines
(the boundaries of that power) are "pricked out by the gradual ap-
.12. WALKER, FEDERAL LnIITATIONS UPON MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE MAKINC
POWER 2, 3 (1929).
-'13: -1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 20 (2d ed. 1953).
14. Stubbe v. Adamson, 220 N.Y. 459, 116 N.E. 372 (1917).
15. Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
16. Ibid.
17,, 1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 16 (2d ed. 1953).
18. Chief Justice Shaw in Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53, 85 (Mass.
1862).
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proach and contact of decisions on the opposing sides."'19 Said Judge
Pound in a decision concerning the police power: "The struggle to
meet changing conditions through new legislation constantly goes
on. The fundamental question is whether society is prepared for
the change. The law of each age is ultimately what that age thinks
should be to law. ' 20 Such, then, is the nature of the power which a
state may delegate to a municipality to meet its zoning problems.
Where the community welfare requires it, the state being willing to
make the grant, the power can be exercised broadly, both as to subject
matter and area.
A grant of power to a municipality is strictly construed. Thus,
if there is a fair and reasonable doubt concerning the existence of the
power, it is resolved against the city.21 On the other hand, if the
existence of the power be conceded, ordinances passed pursuant to
the power are presumed to be valid. The court assumes that the ordi-
nance has been adopted by those who are familiar with the conditions
in the locality affected. 22 The judgment of the local legislative body
will not be interfered with unless that body has over-stepped the con-
stitutional limitations and exceeded its powers.23 When the validity 'of
a zoning ordinance is thus brought into question, and the issue is fairly
debatable, the ordinance: stands as constitutional.
24
Generally, municipal ordinances are effective only up to, and not be-
yond, the corporate boundaries. That is a statement of the general
rule, but, as is frequently the case, there is an exception to the rule.
Perhaps the general. rule could better be stated in this manner! A
municipality cannot exercise its power beyond its own corporate
limits without legal authority. The right to exercise police power
beyond the city's boundaries must be derived from a state grant which
expressly or impliedly permits it. If that power be only impliedly
granted, the power must be essential to the performance of something
which is expressly authorized.25 In support of these general state-
ments it may be well to summarize a few court holdings:
A city may operate beyond its limits without restrictions if the
legislature grants such authority.
26
Generally, city powers cease at its limits and cannot without plain
manifestation of legislative intention be exercised beyond its limits.
2 7
19. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911).
20. People ex rel. Durham R. Corp. v. La Fetra, 230 N.Y. 429, 130 N.E. 601
(1922). T "
21. Irvin v. Torbert, 204 Ga. 111, 49 S.E.2d 70 (1948). ,,
22. West Bros. Brick Co. v. Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 192 S.E. 881 (1937).•
23. 1 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 358-59 (2d ed. 1911).
24. West Bros. Brick Co. v. Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 192 S.E. 881 (1937);
Wulfson v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 150 N.E. 120 (1925).
25. McQuILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 229 (2d ed. 1940).
26. Central Lincoln Peoples' Utility Dist. v. Smith, 170 Ore. 356, 133 P.2d
702 (1943).
27. Ex parte Ernest, 138 Tex. Crim. R. 441, 136 S.W.2d 295 (1939).
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As a rule, city power ceases at the boundaries and cannot without
plain delegation of the necessary power from a proper authority be
exercised outside of its geographical limits.
28
"Usually the police power of a city is exercised only within its own
area and cannot be exerted elsewhere, even though the corporation
may have acquired property outside of its geographical area, but the
legislature may grant the city right to exercise police power outside
its corporate limits.
29
z A municipal corporation has no extraterritorial powers and cannot
without specific legislative authority exercise powers beyond its
governmental limits.30
The foregoing decisions sufficiently point out that if the state has
granted authority to the city the latter may exercise its police power
beyond the municipal limits. Municipalities have exercised extra-
territorial power in such a manner that property rights have been
vitally affected, much the same as property rights would be affected
by a zoning law. For example:
It has been held valid for a city to exercise police jurisdiction within
three miles of a city, and under that power the city could levy a privi-
lege tax on business.
31
A city was permitted to prohibit and abate offensive and unwhole-
some businesses or establishments within one mile of its boundaries.3
It is permissible for a city, under state authority, to exercise power
for sanitary and police purposes beyond its municipal boundaries.3
As long as a century ago a type of extraterritorial zoning law was
upheld. In 1849, the City of Savannah, Georgia, could validly prohibit
rice farms within one mile of the city.
34
The City of Baltimore could regulate or prohibit slaughter houses,
hog farms and nuisances dangerous to health and safety of the people
-of the city, within an area extending three miles from its boundaries.3
'These are a few of the examples that illustrate the extraterritorial
exercise of police power. The use of the individual's property is re-
stricted; the owner of land within three miles of Baltimore was not
permitted to establish a slaughterhouse. Such a regulation may be a
detriment and hindrance to the particular property owner, but it is
definitely for the benefit of the community generally.
Ordinances such as those just illustrated amount to an extra-
28. St. Louis v. Lee, 235 Mo. App. 309, 132 S.W.2d 1055 (1939).
29. Shreveport v. Case, 198 La. 702, 4 So.2d 801 (1941).
30. City of Sedalia v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 81 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1936):
Gainesville v. Dunlap, 147 Ga. 344, 94 S.E. 247 (1917).
31. City of Homewood v. Wofford Oil Co., 232 Ala. 634, 169 So. 288 (1936).
32. St. Bernard Poultry Farm v. City of Aurora, 98 Colo. 158, 54 P.2d 684
(1936).
33. Light v. Danville, 168 Va. 181, 190 S.E. 276 (1937).
34. Green v. Mayor of Savannah, 6 Ga. 1 (1849).
35. Harrison v. Mayor of Baltimore, 1 Gill 264 (Md. 1843).
[ Vor'. 8
EXTRATERRITORIAL ZONING
territorial extension of municipal laws for a single purpose. The city
is a subdivision of, and subordinate to, the state, and the legislature
may alter the municipal boundaries in the absence of constitutional
restriction.- Thus, a legislature can, if it sees fit, make a general
extension of the boundaries, or it can extend the boundaries for a
single purpose. A common example is for the city to be enabled to
attach adjacent areas for school purposes. That, in effect, extends the
limits solely for public educational purposes. The examples previously
given can also be looked upon as an extension of the municipal
boundaries for one or more purposes-health, sanitation, public order,
etc. It would seem to follow that an extension of the city limits for
zoning purposes would also be valid, if authorized by the state, as in
furtherance of the health, safety and general welfare of the public.
There are limitations upon the exercise of the police power. Perhaps
the most important limitation is that of reasonableness. To be a valid
exercise of the police power, a law must be reasonable and must be
administered reasonably. Reasonableness is tested largely by what is
ordinary usage and knowledge gained by common experience 7 The
law and its application must be reasonable under the circumstances of
the particular case.38 If the ordinance is discriminatory or assumes the
character of an arbitrary fiat, the courts will interfere and declare the
law invalid. The classifications in the law must be reasonable and
there must be a reasonable relationship between the regulations and
the purpose, which must be within the scope of the police power. Thus,
if the legislative grant of extraterritorial zoning authority covers an
area broader than that reasonably required to protect the city and its
metropolitan area, or if the authority is used unreasonably, the courts
will strike down such grant or action. A Tennessee case has held that
a legislative grant of power to a city, giving the city authority to pro-
hibit dairies and stables in an area ten miles beyond the city limits,
was invalid as too sweeping and unreasonable.39 On the other hand,
the Georgia Supreme Court upheld the right of the City of Atlanta
to condemn land, outside its own corporate limits, and within the
boundaries of another municipal corporation, for airport purposes.40
Atlanta was found to have acted in a reasonable manner, in good faith,
without abuse of its authority, and the land involved was reasonably
necessary for a proper municipal purpose.
Assuming the extension of the city limits for zoning purposes to be
reasonable, another important problem arises. If there is a general
extension of the corporate boundaries, the residents of the annexed
area become voters of the city, if qualified; but if the limits of the city
36. Geweke v. Village of Niles, 368 Ill. 463, 14 N.E.2d 482 (1938).
37. 1 YOIUEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 28, p. 40 (2d ed.. 1953).
38. Ballard v. Roth, 141 Misc. 319, 253 N.Y.S. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
39. Malone v. Williams, 118 Tenn. 390, 103 S.W. 798 (1907).
40. Howard v. Atlanta, 190 Ga. 730, 10 S.E.2d 190 (1940).
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are extended for a single purpose the qualified voters in the adjacent
area do not become members of the municipal electorate. Thus the
question is raised: Is all government by consent of the governed? That
it must be so was alleged in an Indiana case, but the court decided the
case without commenting or ruling upon that point.
41
Closely allied to that problem (all government shall be by consent
of those governed) is the doctrine of local self-government.4 This
doctrine was clearly enunciated by Judge Cooley of the Michigan
Supreme Court.43 The courts. of Michigan, Kentucky,
44 Indiana,45
Iowa,46 - and Texas47 have approved the doctrine. The majority of the
states have held contrary to that view.48 Adhering to the inherent
right of local self-government would indicate that consent of the
governed is a prerequisite to a valid law.
However, granting that consent of the governed is essential and a
pierequisite to a valid law in the United States, an extraterritorial
zoning statute could still be upheld. The governed have given their
consent through their representatives in the legislature. If the people
affected oppose the law, they have their remedy, not at the municipal
polls, but in the elections which select the state legislature. The wis-
dom of the legislature in passing a law does not affect the constitu-
tionality of the law; action at the polls is the remedy provided by our
form of government. 4 9
CONCLUSION
In conclusion and summary, it may be said that, though extra-
territorial municipal zoning may be a drastic step, there are circum-
stances where it may be the only practicable satisfactory solution.
There are, of course, some cases where it is not necessary, and where
it would be impolitic to suggest such a measure. Where zoning can be
accomplished by the county, and where close cooperation between
county and city governments is possible, the necessary results can be
achieved under present patterns.50
41. Robb. v. Indianapolis, 38 Ind. 49 (1871).
42. McBain, The Doctrine of an Inherent Right of Local Self-Government,
16 COL. L. REV. 190, 299 (1916).
43. People ex rel. LeRoy v. Hurlburt, 24 Mich. 44 (1871).
44. City of Lexington v. Thompson, 113 Ky. 540, 68 S.W. 477 (1902).
45. State ex rel. Jameson v. Denny, 118 Ind. 382, 21 N.E. 252 (1889).
46. State ex rel. White v. Barker, 116 Iowa 96, 89 N.W. 204 (1902).
47. Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. R. 1, 73 S.W. 811 (1903).
48. McBain, supra note 42, at 216.
49. Anderson, Extraterritorial Power of Cities, 10 MINN. L. REV. 581 (1926).
50. For example, The City Planning Commission of the City of Atlanta has
legislative authority to investigate and make suggestions and recommenda-
tions to the general council, commissioners of roads and revenues of Fulton
County, and to the General Assembly of Georgia, with reference to an area
covering six miles adjacent to the corporate boundaries. Georgia Laws of
1929, p. 825. The officers of the City of Atlanta and Fulton County maintain
close co-operation, and the city performs the planning for that area. The city
notifies the county as to zoning of the areas at the corporate boundary, and the
county then zones the adjacent areas conformably.
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Where no other satisfactory solution appears, it seems that extra-
territorial municipal zoning may be validly accomplished. A zoning
law is an exercise of the police power. The city receives its authority
from the state, usually by an enabling stature. An exercise of the police
power by a municipality, extraterritorially, under an ordinance passed
pursuant to an enabling act, is not new, and has been generally upheld
as valid. An argument against the validity of such an ordinance is that
all government is by consent of the governed, and that the people in
the affected area beyond the corporate limits are not qualified voters of
the city and therefore have not given their consent to the zoning
ordinances. An answer to this argument is that the qualified voters in
the area have consented to the law through their representatives in the
state legislature, and they have their remedy at the polls.
A municipal zoning ordinance with an extraterritorial effect is sub-
ject to certain limitations and restrictions. The city officials must not
abuse their discretion and they must act in a reasonable manner. The
entire pattern of the law must be reasonable, not arbitrary or discrimi-
natory, and the law and its administration must be aimed at a proper
public purpose.
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